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Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case- On March 12, 2014 petitioner applied to the Secretary of State's 
office to be included on the 2014 General election ballot for the position of State Represe11tative 
Seat B in Legislative District 19. The application was denied on the grounds that the petitioner 
had not been continuously registered to vote starting on or before Nov 4th 2013. Petitioner 
believed and maintains that the respondent inappropriately uses the definition of "qualified 
elector" in place of the term "elector" as used in the constitutional provision. Thus respondent 
interprets Article 3 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution to require 1 full year of uninterrupted 
voter registration for inclusion on the general election ballot for legislative office. Petitioner 
believed and maintains that he met the constitutional qualifications for office and that the 
Respondent is creating additional requirements found neither in statute nor in the constitution. 
Namely, that in addition to meeting the constitutional definition of an elector by fulfilling 
requirements of age, citizenship, and residency, a legislative candidate must also have registered 
and thus become a "qualified elector" at least one year prior to the election. 
Petitioner was informed on March 12th that Idaho Statute 34-215 allowed him the option 
of appealing the respondent's decision to the District Court. This notice contained no mention of 
a deadline for filing the appeal, and none was found in a review of the statute. Petitioner worked 
diligently to identify and exhaust any informal, administrative, and otherwise non-judicial means 
to resolve the issue. After a discussion on April l st 2014 with Kriss Bivens Cloyd, (who is not an 
attorney, but was the only staff at the A G's office that petitioner was allowed access to) 
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petitioner decided that administrative remedies had been exhausted. Petitioner immediately 
turned to judicial remedies, and filed with the District Court 17 days later. At no time was 
petitioner informed that his right to appeal to the district court was the only available form of 
relief, or that there were no administrative remedies to exhaust. 
Course of the Proceedings- A hearing was held on May l 4t\ 2014 at the District Court 
on petitioners appeal to the court to assess and correct respondent's use of the constitutional term 
"elector" in vetting candidates for state legislative office. Respondent argued that a writ could 
not be issued because an appeal under Statute 34-215 was an adequate remedy at law. Petitioner 
argued that the proceedings were in fact an appeal under Statute 34-215 as stated in the opening 
sentence of the petition and corroborated by the substance of the pleadings. Respondent 
maintained that even when viewing the petition as an appeal, it should be dismissed as untimely 
filed according to IRCP Rule 84(b ). Petitioner asked the court to refer to Statute 67-5273 instead 
of Rule 84 to determine timeliness. Not taking into account Statute 67-5273, the Court ordered 
that the petition be dismissed, whether viewed as a writ of mandate or petition for judicial 
review. The writ would be dismissed for availability of other adequate remedies at law, and the 
appeal would be dismissed as untimely. It was not stated by the court why Rule 84 was given 
precedence over Statute. 
Some arguments on the constitutional merits of the case were also heard, but the 
dismissal precluded a judgment on the merits. Empathy was expressed by the Court for the 
confusion created by the law, and it was suggested that the Secretary of State's Office appraise 
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the Legislature of this issue so that Idaho Code can be updated to remove the confusion caused 
by its variance from this interpretation of the Constitution. 
Statement of Facts 
Caption of the Appeal 
A court evaluates a pleading by its substance not its caption. State v. Blume 743 P.2d 94 
(1987) petitioner does not believe respondent disputes this fact, especially because they were the 
first to introduce it into the proceedings. 
While the cause of the mislabeled appeal, accidentally captioned "Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus", was the result of confusion on the part of the Pro Se appellant, evaluating the 
pleading by its substance is standard procedure and no special leniency is being requested. 
ICRP 84 is a "catch-all" rule; it governs the procedure of the District Court's judicial 
review only where statute is silent. Judicial review in this particular case is governed by Title 67 
Chapter 52 Idaho Code which addresses most of the issues associated with judicial review 
including timeliness. Wherever possible the statute should be used instead of Rule 84. 
Jurisdiction of this statute over the proceedings is addressed at great length in the arguments. 
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Exhaustion of non-judicial remedies 
At the time petitioner received notice that he could appeal to the District Court, he was 
unfamiliar with the vocabulary and statutes surrounding exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
As a lay-person, he simply knew that it is wrong to use the judicial system as a first resort, and 
non-judicial remedies should be attempted before filing a case. 
Distinction of the terms "elector" and "qualified elector" 
It should be noted that there is no disagreement between the parties that "registration as 
provided by law" is one of the substantive qualifications of a "qualified elector"; the issue in 
contention is the definition of"elector". Petitioner makes the argument that an "elector" holds 
every substantive qualification of a "qualified elector", except registration as provided by law. 
While respondent contends that the two terms are synonyms. 
Equal Protection 
Respondent has not claimed to have disqualified a single incumbent legislator from 
running for or holding office by authority of the same legal theory used to disqualify petitioner 
and many other non-incumbent candidates over the 40 years he has worked at the Secretary of 
State's office. While obviously not definitive by itself, this strongly suggests that the law may 
not have been applied equally to incumbent candidates and non-incumbent candidates alike. If 
incumbents have been subject to the same scrutiny as non-incumbents, there should either be 
instances of incumbent disqualification in the previous 40 years, or documented verification for 
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every legislator who has changed addresses while in office, that they did indeed update their 
voter registration within 30 days as required. 
Lack of Public Education Regarding Registration 
Because Idaho voter registration laws allow same day voter it is not 
surprising that petitioner, like many residents the state, did not pre-register after he 
moved into the district, simply because Idaho law allows the state's electors to register to vote at 
polls on Election day. Petitioner, and likely the majority of Idaho's qualified electors, had 
never heard or imagined that are rights that could be forfeited due to technicalities 
regarding voter registration even if the right and ability to vote was never impeded. 
These questions now come before this court: 
1) Should time have tolled for petitioner's attempts to exhaust administrative remedies as 
stated in Idaho Statute 67-5273(3), or was it correct for time to continue running during 
petitioners attempts because those attempts did not meet the specific criteria found in 
IRCP Rule 84(b )? 
2) Should the Secretary of State continue to interpret the Idaho Constitution to read that 
unlike other state offices, an elector must also have been continuously registered to vote 
for over a year in order to be an Idaho legislator? 
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Issues Presented on Appeal 
1) Pleadings are a petition for judicial review: The District Court contemplated that the 
pleading denominated "petition for writ of mandamus" could be judged by its substance 
to be an appeal under Statute 34-215. The court offered two different reasons for its 
dismissal of the petition, one that applied to the pleadings as a petition for mandamus, 
and another which applied to the pleadings as an appeal for judicial review. It is an issue 
on this appeal that the original pleadings should be evaluated by their substance rather 
than by their captions, and therefore treated as pleadings for judicial review rather than an 
extraordinary writ. 
2) Timeliness is addressed and governed by statute: The District Court erred by ignoring 
Idaho Statute 67-5273 and instead relying on IRCP 84(b), a "catch-all" rule to determine 
the timeliness of the appeal. Appellant asserts that the catch-all rule is superseded by this 
statute, and it is the statute not the rule that should have been used to determine 
timeliness. Accordingly, the court's decision regarding timeliness should not have been 
affected by the very specific language of Rule 84 requiring a "motion for 
reconsideration" and time should have tolled by statute for "the pendency of the 
petitioner's timely attempts to exhaust administrative remedies", consisting of the 20 
days from March lih to April 1st 2014. 
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3) Even according to the "catch-all" rule time should have tolled: Even if the Court is 
somehow compelled to apply IRCP 84(b) when considering the timeliness of the appeal, 
time should have tolled for petitioners attempts to exhaust administrative remedies. 
4) Statutory and Constitutional merits should be ruled on: Because the District Court 
did not reach the merits of the statutory and constitutional issue, stating that it would be 
best served to be addressed by another court in a position to set precedent, it becomes an 
issue to this appeal that the court should reach the merits of the case and issue an opinion 
clarifying for the Secretary of State's Office, and all Idaho citizens, the constitutional 
qualifications required to work as an Idaho legislator. Any and all unlisted issues and 
arguments related to the statutory and constitutional merits of the case shall be considered 
subsidiaries of this issue. 
Arguments 
I. The original pleadings should be evaluated by their substance rather than by their captions, 
and therefore should be viewed and treated as pleadings for judicial review rather than for an 
extraordinary writ. 
1.1. A court evaluates a pleading by its substance not its caption. In State v Blume 743 P.2d 
94 (1987) the Court says "Although Blume's pleading was denominated a petition for a 
wTit of review rather than for a \\Tit of prohibition, we evaluate a pleading by its 
substance rather than by its caption. The substance, as we view it. was that Blume 
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wanted the district court to detem1ine that Judge Heise was disqualified and no longer 
had jurisdiction in the case." The Court gives a great amount of deference to both the 
intent of the author, and the substance of the document, over its caption. 
1.2. Opposing Council recognized that appellant's pleadings may be evaluated by their 
substance rather than their caption and be viewed as an appeal under Statute 34-215. 
1.2.1. At the hearing, respondent stated " ... we can treat the papers as mislabeled and 
they actually are an appeal..." (Tr Vol. I, p. 16, L. 9-14) 
1.2.2. The entirety of pages 4 and 5 of MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS address the petitioner's 
pleadings viewing them as an appeal under Idaho Statute 34-215. In fact, 
respondent has not sited any authorities or made any argument that the pleadings 
should be evaluated by their captions. 
1.3. The District Court contemplated that the pleading denominated "petition for writ of 
mandamus" could be judged by its substance to be an appeal under Statute 34-215, but 
declined to commit the Court to stating whether or not it indeed viewed the pleading as a 
petition for judicial review. (Tr Vol. I, p. 36, L. 12-20) The court made no mention of 
statutes, rules, or authorities that suggest the pleadings should be evaluated by their 
caption. 
1.4. The petition was initially mislabeled due to a simple misunderstanding, early on in the 
process appellant was misinformed that a "Writ of Mandamus" was the designation for 
any order from the courts compelling a state officer to perform a specific act. Appellant 
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used the term in the context of his then erroneous understanding of it, as is illustrated by 
some confusion at the hearing. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 14-21, Tr Vol. I, p. 30, L. 12-13 In 
using the term, appellant did not intend to refer to an extraordinary writ, or anything 
outside the scope of an appeal under Statute 34-215. The Substance and intent of the 
pleadings are clearly in line with an appeal for judicial review, and not an extraordinary 
writ. 
1.5. Viewing these pleadings by their substance as a petition for judicial review should not be 
confused with allowing a writ to function as the equivalent of an appeal as the court 
contemplated Tr Vol. I, p. 36, L. 9-12. If the pleadings are judged by their substance, 
than there is no writ in these proceedings; it is simply a mislabeled appeal functioning as 
an appeal. 
1.5.1. For a writ to function as the equivalent of an appeal, it would first have to be 
judged by its substance to be a writ. 
2. Procedures governing the original appeal for judicial review are in fact provided by statute; 
these procedures provided by statute supersede the IRCP Rule 84 and nullify the application 
of that rule to determine timeliness. The conclusions reached by the district court utilizing 
Rule 84 must be set aside and the issues must be reconsidered utilizing the statute. 
2.1. Procedures governing judicial review are set by statute; only where no procedure or 
standard of review is provided by statute does the "Catch-all" rule, IRCP Rule 84, apply. 
While this case is authorized by Idaho Statute 34-215, the judicial review proceedings 
are also described and governed by Title 67 Chapter 52 Idaho Code. Since the 
13 
procedure and standards of review are provided by statute, IRCP Rule 84 does not apply 
and has no bearing on determinations of timeliness. The following definitions and 
authorities from Title 67 Chapter 52 Idaho Code clearly designate these proceedings as a 
judicial review of agency action to be governed by the provisions of this statute, not 
Rule 84. 
2.1.1. 67-5201(2) "Agency" means each state board, comm1ss10n, 
department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine 
contested cases, but does not include the legislative or judicial branches, 
executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of the constitution of the 
state of Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively 
from the constitution, the state militia or the state board of correction. 
2.1.1.1. While the Respondent is one of the executive officers listed in sectionl, 
article 4, of the Idaho constitution, the powers delegated to the State's Chief 
Elections Officer are not derived directly or exclusively from the constitution, 
but rather from Statute 34-201. The Respondent fits the definition of an 
"Agency" enumerated in this Statute. 
2.1.2. 67-5201 (3) "Agency action" means: 
(a) The whole or part of a rule or order; 
(b) The failure to issue a rule or order; or 
(c) An agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on 
it by law. 
2.1.2.1. The respondent's improper denial of appellant's application to be included 
on the 2014 general election ballot meets this statute's definition of "Agency 
Action" under 67-5201(3)(c). 
14 
2.1.3. 67-5270 RIGHT OF REVIEW (1) Judicial review of agency action shall be 
governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other provision of law is 
applicable to the particular matter. 
2.1.3.1. Idaho Statute 34-215 contains some specific provisions applicable to 
particular matters in this judicial review, such as the right of either party to 
appeal the District Court decision to the State Supreme Court, and the 
guarantee that the remedy provided in this statute is cumulative and does not 
exclude any other remedy provided by law. Aside from these and any other 
such applicable provisions, this judicial review of agency action is governed by 
Title 67 Chapter 52 Idaho Code and there is no allowance or authority for 
IRCP Rule 84 to take precedence over the procedures codified in statute. 
2.2. The District Court erred by applying IRCP Rule 84 to determine timeliness of the 
appeal; timeliness is addressed by Idaho Statute 67-5273(3): 
2.2.1. 67-5273(3) A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other than a 
rule or order must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, 
except as provided by other provision of law. The time for filing a petition for 
review shall be extended during the pendency of the petitioner's timely attempts to 
exhaust administrative remedies, if the attempts are clearly not frivolous or 
repetitious. 
3. Appellant was engaged in efforts to identify and exhaust administrative remedies from March 
12th through April 1st 2014 and time for filing the original appeal should have tolled for these 
attempts in accordance with Idaho Statute 67-5273(3) 
3.1. Petersen v. Franklin County, 938 P.2d 1214, clearly addressed the tolling of time for 
good faith attempts to exhaust administrative remedies. Like the current appellant, the 
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landowners in the Petersen case also had no administrative remedies available to them, 
and also were not informed that they had no administrative remedies available to them. 
These appellants spent 51 days attempting to exhaust administrative remedies until they 
were informed that none existed. Time was found to toll for their misinformed and futile 
attempts, and the same should be found for this Appellant who used only 20 days for his 
attempts. 
3.] .1. The court's written decision in Petersen v. Franklin Coumy supra. stated the 
following: 
"Although the detennination of a site was made at the January 26, 
1994 meeting of the Commission, the time during which the 
Landowners could file a timely petition for judicial review of the 
Commission's site selection was tolled while they attempted to exhaust 
their administrative remedies. The Landowners continued their efforts 
with the Commission until they were infonned that their 
administrative remedies had been exhausted on March 17, 1994. The 
Landowners timely filed their petition for judicial review on April I, 
1994. well within a twenty-eight (28) day period beginning March 17, 
1994.'' 
3 .1.2. In hearing Petersen v. Franklin County, the following exchange occurred between 
Justice Johnson and counsel for the County. 
Johnson, J.: Were there any administrative remedies available to these 
plaintiffs after January 26, 1994, to challenge the selection? 
Hall: No. 
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3. l.2.1. Similar to the appellant in the current case, there were never any 
administrative remedies available for the landowners. The fact that the court 
found time to toll for 51 days during the pendency of their attempts to exhaust 
administrative remedies- even though no such remedies ever existed, shows 
that factors including the likelihood of successful remedy, actual availability of 
remedies, and procedural steps followed in the attempts are not considered 
when determining the tolling of time. 
3.1.2.2. The District Court seemed to put a significant amount of consideration 
into the type of attempts made by appellant, the processes and procedure of the 
attempts, their likelihood of success, and who the attempts were directed at 
influencing; statute is clear though, none of these factors have any bearing on 
whether or not time tolls. If attempts are made and those attempts are clearly 
not frivolous or repetitious, statute provides that time will toll. 
3.1.3. Idaho Code gives only 2 reasons that time might not toll for the appellant's 
attempts at administrative remedies; those are if the attempts are found to be 
··frivolous'' or ·'repetitious". Idaho Statute. 67-5273 (3). 
3.1.3.1. The appellant's attempts to achieve administrative remedy through the 
AG's office cannot be found to be "frivolous" because they were partially 
effective. 
3.1.3.1.L The documents at the center of this case. which were filed by the 
appellant in his effort to register as a candidate for legislative office. and 
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were rejected by the Respondent on March 12th included "'Form C-1 
Appointment and Certification of Political Treasurer". There has been no 
directive from the courts for the Respondent to accept and file Form C-1 
from the appellant. Yet based on a statement from the Attorney General's 
Office obtained by the appellant_ this form was accepted and filed by the 
Respondent on June 6th 2014. This change in position from the 
respondent's office shows good cause for the appellant's belief that 
administrative relief could be obtained through effotis to seek 
clarification from the AG's office. 
3.1.3.2. The appellant's attempts to achieve administrative remedy through the 
AG's office cannot be found to be "repetitious'' because as soon as it was made 
clear on April 1st that the AG's office was either unwilling or unable to work 
with the appellant, he abandoned attempts at administrative remedy and 
immediately began working to file with the district court, which was 
completed in 17 days, well ahead of the 28 day deadline. 
3. l .4. Exhausting administrative remedies is a statutory requirement every appellant 
must complete before filing for judicial review . 
. 67-5271. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. (1) A 
person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency action until that 
person has exhausted all administrative remedies required in this chapter. 
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The fact that there is no clear process for administrative relief, nor a clear 
statement regarding whether or not relief even exists, does not relieve an appellant 
of this responsibility; it simply makes that responsibility more difficult and time 
consuming, fmiher necessitating the tolling of time for attempts to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
3.1.5. Idaho Statute 67-524l(l)(c) states "Informal settlement of matters is to be 
encouraged." The appellant should not be punished for first attempting to resolve 
the issue through administrative, informal, and non-judicial means as statute 
requires. Allowing time to toll for attempts at administrative/informal remedies 
encourages informal settlement of matters as required by statute; conversely, 
preventing the tolling of time will discourage informal settlement of matters and 
deter attempts to exhaust administrative remedies. 
4. Even if Rule 84 is applied, the appeal should be found to be timely. 
4.1. IRCP Rule 84(b) is written as if there is a standard universal procedure for exhausting 
administrative remedies prior to appealing for judicial review. Since the Secretary of 
State has authority to reconsider the decisions of his office, but does not have any 
process in place for handling a "Motion for Reconsideration" this rule, as written, would 
burden the appellant with the responsibility of exhausting administrative remedies, while 
denying the tolling of time for those attempts, since they differ from the specific action 
allowed by rule. 
4.2. Respondent should not accrue a benefit by muddying the waters. 
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4.2.1. Any deadline for filing the appeal should have been included with the notice 
provided by respondent of appellant's right to appeal. Respondent benefitted by 
omitting important information regarding appellant's rights that cannot be found in 
statute and was essentially hidden from appellant until after it was too late. 
4.2.2. Instead of informing the appellant that the decision was final and the only 
remedies available were judicial, respondent's office muddied the waters by 
bringing an Attorney General's opinion into the conversation and creating the 
impression that the AG's office was somehow involved, or at least could be. This 
letter characterized addressing the issue with the AG as the only form ofrelief that 
had actually been attempted; it seemed to be written as if it is standard procedure to 
take an issue like this to the AG. It is still unclear why the AG's office involved 
themselves in this issue at the request of the wrongfully disqualified party in 1998 
but refused to address the situation in any way whatsoever with the current appellant 
unless he first brought a suit against the State or one of its Officers. 
4.2.3. The confusion created by the respondent's office resulted in the appellant 
spending 20 days trying to communicate with the AG's office in an attempt to 
identify possible administrative remedies to exhaust. Without this delay, there 
would not be an issue of timeliness. Dismissing this case because of that delay 
would be contrary to the interest of Justice, and of the State. State Agencies should 
not be incentivized to create confusion for people considering appealing their 
decisions. 
20 
5. Petitioner asserts that the terms "elector" and "qualified elector" are each separately defined 
in the Idaho Constitution, Article 6 Section 2. This understanding is in line with Dredge and 
6. 
other case law. 
Article 6 Section 2. QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS. Every male 
or female citizen of the United States, eighteen years old, who has 
resided in this state, and in the county where he or she offers to vote 
for the period provided by law, if registered as provided by law, is a 
qualified elector. 
5 .1. Elector: Every male or female citizen of the United States, eighteen years old, who has 
resided in this state, and in the county where he or she offers to vote for the period 
provided by law. 
5.2. Qualified Elector: An Elector who has also registered as provided by law. 
5 .3. A person may have all of the qualifications of an elector, and not have all of the 
qualifications of a "Qualified Elector". Qualifying to be an "elector" is different from 
qualifying to be a "Qualified Elector"; even a "Disqualified Elector" is still referred to as 
an elector in Idaho Code. 
5.3.1. Idaho Code, Section 34-403. DISQUALIFIED ELECTORS NOT PERMITTED 
TO VOTE. No elector shall be permitted to vote if he is disqualified as provided in 
article 6, sections 2 and 3 of the state constitution. 
Vol. I, p. 19, L. 24 p.20, L. 8. Respondent characterizes petitioner as the 
tenn "elector" is same as or ''inhabitant", and lays out why that would be 
This characterization completely ignores s actual argument that 
terms ·'elector" and ''qualified elector" have unique definitions, and are both defined 
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Article 6 Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution. Neither term is synonymous with the words 
"resident" or "inhabitant". 
7. No statute in Idaho Code disqualified the Applicant from holding the office of State 
Representative, or from being placed on the ballot for election to that office. The applicable 
statute reads: 
34-614 (2) No person shall be elected to the office ofrepresentative or 
senator unless he shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years 
at the time of the general election, is a citizen of the United States and 
shall have resided within the legislative district one ( 1) year next 
preceding the general election at which he offers his candidacy. 
7.1. The respondent stipulated this, and the District Court seemed to find this fact troubling at 
the hearing, Tr Vol. I, p. 18, L. 10-24, Tr Vol. I, p. 19, L. 9-15 
THE COURT: Why -- and maybe it's not clear why -- why doesn't 
the statute -- do you have any understanding why the statute 
doesn't list that as a requirement? 
MR. GILMORE: I wish I could answer that question, your Honor. 
I don't know why the statute doesn't list the constitutional 
requirement. 
THE COURT: It seems to me it's a set-up for the non-legally 
trained, and perhaps even the legally trained, to miss a deadline to 
file without knowledge, intricate knowledge of the constitutional 
requirements that are not set forth in the statute. Does your office 
do anything in terms of education with a packet that would identify 
that for prospective candidates? 
MR. GILMORE: If anyone asks, they are told that's the requirement. 
THE COURT: Which begs the question if they don't know to ask how --
MR. GILMORE: How do you find out. 
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7.2. Petitioner contends that the statute does list all of the constitutional requirements, and 
this is evidence that the legislature would concur with the petitioner's view of the 
constitutional requirements enumerated in Art. 3 Sec 6 Idaho Constitution. 
7.3. The interpretation of the Constitution used by the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
General to justify rejecting the application is one that is neither justified by law nor 
clearly endorsed by any decision of Idaho courts. It is simply the way they have done 
things for the last 40 years. 
8. Portraying the use of words as "haphazard" and "interchangeable" only serves to protect the 
status quo by providing an excuse not to shoulder the burden ascribed by Westerberg v. 
Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 403-04 to reconcile constitutional provisions if at all possible 
inasmuch as they relate to the same subject matter in a manner that will give effect to every 
word in the constitution. 
8.1. To note that the two terms "elector" and "qualified elector" may be used interchangeably 
is not to say that they share the same definition or are synonymous; interchangeability is 
still dependent on context. Many electors are also qualified electors, this makes the 
words somewhat interchangeable, but by no means makes them synonyms. 
8.2. Some interchangeability is to be expected between 2 words when one of the words 
represents a more specific subdivision of the other. It is fallacy to assume that this 
means the terms are synonyms, or universally interchangeable. Here is a sentence 
substantially echoed throughout the respondent's case law where the terms are clearly 
not interchangeable: A "qualified elector" is an "elector" who is also registered 
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according to law. If these terms are viewed as universally interchangeable then this 
sentence loses any meaning, it becomes absurd and confusing. 
8.3. Likewise, the appearance of a word being used haphazardly is dependent on context. If 
the difference between the two terms is not significant to the context of a particular case 
or conversation, then their use will appear haphazard, no matter how clearly organized 
and intentional it is in the broader context. 
8.4. Labeling a word or words as "interchangeable" and "used haphazardly" is all that is 
required to render them without effect and "mere surplusage" contrary to Westerberg. 
8.5. What takes precedence- The mandate to give effect to every word when 
interpreting the constitution; or the excuse that some words are used 
haphazardly and should have no effect? 
9. Voter registration is important to prevent fraud in matters of voting and petition signing. It 
serves no purpose as a requirement to run for office, while causing clear harm to the state by 
creating a barrier for qualified legislative candidates. 
9.1. Idaho allows same day voter registration at our polling places. This removes any reason 
for an Idaho Citizen to immediately update their voter registration upon moving. The 
explanation provided by county employees to citizens about how to maintain their 
registration when moving within the State, often includes the suggestion to simply 
update their registration at the polling place on Election Day. The Secretary of State's 
position is that following this advice should disqualify most electors from running for 
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State Representative or Senator for some time beyond the actual required residency term, 
because if the electors address is not updated within 30 days of change they are no 
longer legally registered to vote. 
9.2. November 5th 2013 was Election Day, so anyone who registered at a polling site and 
voted would be disqualified from running for State Representative in 2014 because they 
are allegedly one day short of the legal requirements. I assert that there is no purpose to 
this policy, no benefit to the State or its citizens, while there is a clear harm in turning 
away qualified persons from running for the legislature. 
10. The respondent should not receive deference from the court on his constitutional 
interpretations. Respondent claims he should be given deference based on Duncan v. State 
Bd. Of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3,232 P.3d 322, 324 (2010) which states that deference is 
granted where an agency interprets a statute or a rule; this is instead a question of state 
constitutional interpretation and is appropriately decided by Idaho's highest court. 
] 1. Respondent draws on two pieces of case law to support his claim that the terms '"elector" and 
'"qualified elector" are synonyms, and registration by law is a requirement for both: Wilson v. 
Bartlett, 7 Idaho 271,272, 62 P. 416,417 (1900) and Kerley v. 11/etherell, 61 Idaho 3L 96 
P.2d 503 (1939). 
11.1. Wilson held that registration is not a substantive part of being an elector. That 
must be taken to mean that in the context of article 3 section 6 registration is not a 
substantive qualification for membership in the legislature. 
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11.2. Kerley is characterized by the respondent as stating that "'electors" must be 
registered, when like any of the case law sited by the respondent, it does not even 
address the term "elector". Kerley states that since the law specifically used the term 
"qualified electors" registration is a requirement. This is something we all agree on. 
12. At the hearing Tr Vol. I, p. 20, L. 16-22, and throughout the record, Respondent references 
Dredge Mining Control-Yes!, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 445 P.2d 655 as if it makes a statement on 
the definition of "elector". The truth of the matter is that the Dredge case does not address 
the definition of elector, it addresses the definition of "Legal Voter". The terms "elector" 
and "qualified elector" as well as "registered elector" are all used throughout the Court's 
opinion in dredge; however, they are used wholly within the context of the petitioners 
definition of those words described in these arguments. There is no statement in the decision 
which represents, as the respondent suggests it does, the theme that when you refer to an 
elector, you are referring to a registered or qualified elector. 
13. There is a systemic barrier to new candidates running for legislature that is not applied to 
incumbents. This barrier is created not by statute or constitutional provision, but by the 
inconsistent manner in which the Secretary of State is enforcing the law. Clearly, sitting 
legislators are not exempt from meeting the qualifications to hold their office, yet that is the 
effect of the manner in which the law is currently being applied. 
13.1. No record has been shown to indicate that there is any verification process to 
ensure that incumbents' registration has not lapsed at any point during the year prior to 
the election, or at any time during their tenure in office. 
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13 .2. If a qualified elector moves, even within the same precinct, their registration is 
canceled unless it is updated within 30 days of the address change. It is not uncommon 
for sitting legislators to move within their district; appellant is personally aware of 
several incumbent legislators who changed addresses during the year preceding the 2014 
election. With the focus that Idaho has on same day registration, it is conceivable and 
even likely that some ofldaho's legislators who move do not update their voter 
registration with 30 days of their address change- especially if they are already on the 
ballot. 
13.3. The fact that the respondent states he has disqualified 12 challengers and 0 
incumbents on these grounds over the last 10 years suggests that challengers may not be 
receiving equal protection under the law. 
14. The respondent must show that incumbent voter registration records are investigated and 
reviewed with the same scrutiny that challengers records are. 
Conclusion 
Appellant requests a comprehensive hearing on the Constitutional merits of this case, and a 
decision by the court offering the instruction and constitutional clarification necessary to ensure 
that the Secretary of State ceases to disqualify legislative candidates due to the current confusion 
regarding the terms "elector"' and "qualified elector''. The Chief Elections Officer, the People of 
Idaho, and the petitioner in this case require and deserve this clarification from the state's highest 
court. 
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If the comt somehow determines that an '·elector'' must be registered to vote in order to be called 
an "elector", petitioner requests that the decision offer instruction and constitutional clarification 
necessary to guarantee equal protection under the law for challenger legislative candidates by 
ensuring that incumbent legislative candidates receive the same scrutiny as challengers in the 
review of their voter registration history, and are disqualified from holding office according to 
the same standards as challenger candidates. 
Dated this I 0th day of November, 2014. 
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By ___________ _ 
Caleb Hansen, Appellant appearing Pro Se 
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